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AN EVALUATION OF LINER
STRATEGIES IN THE CONTEXT
OF CONTEMPORARY SUPPLY CHAIN
MANAGEMENT PRACTICES

Shashi Kumar
Maine Maritime Academy

ABSTRACT
Academic researchers published a sophisticated model of world class logistics in 1995 and
recently updated it with a model of 21st century logistics. Although such practices are yet to
be perfected in the real world, it provides a yardstick for measuring logistical excellence. An
innovative world class firm will pursue sustainable competitive advantage through wellintegrated global supply chains. As liner operators are vital members of global supply chains,
their contemporary strategies need particular scrutiny to identify elements of congruence or
non-congruence. The paper discusses generic liner strategies and identifies the ideal strategy
congruent with contemporary supply chain management practices.

INTRODUCTION
We live in an era of increasing business sophisti
cation. The management of business functions
has undergone radical reengineering and shifted
more towards a system of managing processes
rather than functions. Correspondingly, the
management of business logistics has gained
increasing attention in the last decade and is
now considered a core competency of successful
firms (Coyle, Bardi, and Langley, 1996). Such
firms position themselves through various
strategic choices to establish themselves as
market leaders in the new millennium. They
seek sustainable competitive advantage in the
global marketplace through strategic supply

chain alliances that provide them logistical
superiority. The supply chain alliance partners
of these firms include their suppliers and
suppliers’ suppliers, and customers as well as
various transportation providers and inter
mediaries.
As international business breaks new ground
year after year, the management of business
logistics will become increasingly global, complex
and challenging. The shift towards world-wide
manufacturing and assembling operations will
lead to a greater role for ocean liner shipping
companies who have provided a historically vital
service for shippers, large and small alike. This
is because of the increasing preponderance of
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time-based competition manifested today in
various forms. These include the rapid adoption
of innovative inventory management philo
sophies, like just-in-time manufacturing, reduced
cycle time and above all, a greater recognition of
customer satisfaction.
While these developments are well recognized by
all concerned, the dilemma concerning the eco
nomic efficiency of ocean liner markets continues
today as in the pre-containerization era. Their
role in contemporary supply chains is beyond
question. However, economists, policy-makers,
and academicians perpetually debate the
structure of liner markets and their efficiency
outcomes. There is a continuing rift between
shippers and carriers, and is often reported in
trade journals (Mongeluzzo, 1999). There are
also perceived fall-outs from the partial
deregulation of shipping services in the U.S.
(Bryant, 1999). The objective of this paper is to
scrutinize contemporary ocean liner strategies
given the much wider scope of ongoing changes
in the management of business logistics and
supply chain management in general. It will
highlight areas of mutual congruity and conflict,
and will look into a possible new order in liner
shipping that may facilitate the establishment of
efficient global supply chains.

THE WORLD CLASS
LOGISTICS MODEL (1995) AND
21st CENTURY LOGISTICS (1999)
The Michigan State Global Logistics Research
Team released their findings on world class
logistics in 1995 (Michigan State, 1995). The
study, a continuation of their research on
Leading Edge Logistics (Bowersox et al., 1989)
and Logistics Excellence (Bowersox et al., 1992),
led to the development of a model of World Class
Logistics (WCL). It identified the need for simul
taneous achievement of four key competencies—
positioning, integration, agility and measure
ment—for world class performance. Although the
study did not find any firm that had perfected
the simultaneous achievement and fusion of all
components of the suggested model, it
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established the existence of world class firms
that had made a greater overall commitment in
their effort towards logistical perfection
(Michigan State, 1995).
Positioning, one of the four key competencies of
the WCL model, refers to the selection of
strategic and structural approaches to logistics
operations. Integration leads to the creation of
solid supply chain relationships. Agility is a
firm’s competency with respect to relevancy,
accommodation and flexibility. Measurement
refers to the internal and external monitoring of
results. The model identified seventeen measur
able capabilities under each of the four key
competencies. These capabilities of the four key
competencies are the vehicles for seeking logis
tical excellence. The researchers also showed
that the seventeen identified capabilities are
essentially the same throughout all developed
nations and that being world class does matter
(Michigan State, 1995).
21st Century Logistics, the most recent research
report from the Michigan State Global Logistics
Team, updated the WCL model and extended it
to the broader concept of supply chain manage
ment (Bowersox et al., 1999). It reports that the
overall average of world class competency of
firms did not change significantly from 1995 to
1999 although there were significant improve
ments in a number of the seventeen capabilities
(Bowersox et al., 1999). The study found that
while the positioning competency of firms
improved, with a greater emphasis being given to
providing a high level of service to key cus
tomers, the decrease in several areas, including
supply chain unification, information technology,
information sharing, flexibility, process assess
ment, and benchmarking, was significant. As a
result, the new report focuses on the capabilities
that facilitate internal and external integration.
The attributes included in the 1995 WCL frame
work were found insufficient for sustainable
competitive advantage barely five years later and
have been amended by incorporating factors that
emphasize integrated relationships and enter
prise extension (Bowersox et al., 1999).

Logistics as a Core Competency
The real challenge of today’s managers is not
merely attaining competitive superiority but
maintaining it in the long run. This requires
core competencies and efficient change man
agement capabilities. A firm may not gain
competitive advantage in the increasingly
dynamic global marketplace through its manu
facturing excellence alone. This is where logis
tical competency and the efficiency of the supply
chain alliance become critical for sustained
competitive advantage. Such firms strive to
make logistics management one of their core
competencies and position themselves as leaders
in the global marketplace. They segment their
logistical services by providing different levels of
service over and above their pre-existing superior
level of basic service (Michigan State, 1995). As
a result, they maintain multiple logistics systems
concurrently. Through such a strategy, the firm
can cocoon its customers and retain them.
Customer segmentation is also advantageous
because the most demanding customers could be
looked upon as a source of innovation and change
(Michigan State, 1995). Such a level of synergy
reduces the market uncertainty of the customer
as well as that of all channel members.
Supply chain alliances are an outgrowth of the
core competency emphasis and the challenges of
global competition. They are the modern coun
terparts of vertical integration. They provide the
benefits of joint synergy without the risk of
ownership. The most basic requirement for alli
ance development is that the strategic intent of
all partners be compatible and complementary.
Among world class firms, there is a strong
commitment to increase leverage and reduce
waste through supply chain alliances. The 1999
study finds that responsiveness, flexibility,
speed, dependability and continued sensitivity to
cost will be the drivers of competitive advantage
in future years (Bowersox et al., 1999).
A firm with advanced supply chain capability
will carefully choose its transportation partners
so as to position strategically in the global
marketplace. Deep-sea movement of raw mater

ials and finished goods still constitutes the most
practical and logical way to move a good majority
of them over long distances internationally.
Although international shipping does not enjoy
the privileged status of the previous era as the
sole provider of vital transportation services, it
remains a significant component of global supply
chains as it did then. Liner shipping has a direct
effect on the procurement and trading strategies
of most firms active in the international business
market. They play an important role in the
simultaneous fusion of the components of the
WCL model and the updated 21st Century
Logistics model. As a vital member of global
supply chains, they play a paramount role in
facilitating world class logistical processes.
Hence, the rationale for scrutinizing strategies of
liner operators in the context of today’s
sophisticated business logistics environment.

LITERATURE REVIEW
Many scholars have analyzed the strategies of
liner shipping companies. Marx (1953) provides
a good description of the strategies of liner
companies during the formative years that
included industrial self-regulation through
conference rate making and service rationali
zation, and also their strategies to limit both
internal and external competition. Deakin and
Seward (1973), Evans (1977) and Ellsworth
(1979) provided further analysis of those
strategies in the early containerization era.
Recent contributions in this area include those by
Heaver (1996) and Evangelista and Morvillo
(2000). Evangelista and Morvillo (2000) para
phrase the competitive liner strategies under the
traditional categories of cost leadership and
service differentiation. They argue that carriers
may pursue their cost leadership strategy to the
extent of acquiring other carriers and associate
such an initiative at the most advanced stage of
development of shipping lines. They identify four
levels of logistical integration. At the lowest
level, they provide solely maritime activities and
then progressively move on to providing port
terminal activities, inland transport services and
ultimately logistical services beyond transporta
tion. Their notion of service differentiation is
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derived through the carrier’s involvement in the
customer supply chain and is induced by demand
fluctuations. They state that shippers’ supply
chain strategy is changing the role of trans
portation providers. Their empirical analysis
establishes that service differentiation and a
high degree of inter-firm integration are
relatively incompatible based on the sample they
analyzed. They caution against generalizing
their conclusion as there are other strategic
options open to liner firms that are significantly
involved in movements to interior points.

Limitations of the Evangelista/
Morvillo Model
The authors acknowledge that the only models
they analyzed were cooperative alliances. Aside
from this, the frames of reference used by
Evangelista and Morvillo do not convey a
complete picture of the contemporary supply
chain model. Their usage of the term logistical
integration conveys an incomplete message, and
the examples they provide barely exceed door-todoor transportation capability, which is only one
subset of the logistics system. Furthermore, the
inter-organizational integration as referred to by
them, cannot extend beyond the lower and
medium levels they identified with cooperative
shipping alliances. Hence, their empirical con
clusion that service differentiation and a high
degree of inter-firm integration are relatively
incompatible is only to be expected, and a fact of
life. Furthermore, as uncovered by the 21st
Century Logistics Study (Bowersox et ah, 1999),
the level of integration accomplished by the top
manufacturing businesses themselves is
unsatisfactory.
That being the case, the
relatively low level of inter-firm integration
between liner companies and their customers
and/or third party logistics service providers is
an important albeit low-priority issue and
premature for empirical analysis. The shippers
themselves have a long way to go with their
intra-firm integration prior to solidifying their
inter-firm integration. It is suggested that one
take a broader look at all liner strategies, and
identify those that are congruent with the
principles of contemporary supply chain
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management prior to quantifying the level of
integration between liner operators and their
supply chain partners.

Methodology
The study will classify contemporary liner
strategies into three mutually non-exclusive
categories.
Each of the strategies will be
evaluated in the context of the Michigan State
Models of supply chain management.
Accordingly, the paper will identify liner
strategies that would help the end-to-end
distribution needs of their customers and
contribute as a partner in the global value chain.

CLASSIFICATION OF LINER STRATEGIES
For the purposes of this study, liner strategies
will be classified into three categories, viz., inde
pendent, cooperation and integration strategies.
A brief description of each of the categories
follows next.

Independent Strategy
This is an old strategy and typically used by a
new-entrant liner operator. The increasing scale
barriers in container shipping have impacted the
usefulness of this strategy and with the rare
exception of the China Shipping Group, there
have been hardly any high profile new entrants
in the last few years. Even among the estab
lished traditionally independent incumbents, all
operators, with the exception of Evergreen, have
joined one or more co-operative alliances.
Evergreen’s niche is its cost leadership, and
focuses primarily on port-to-port and round-theworld services. It offers limited door-to-door
services using contractual agreements. While
Evergreen may indeed become a long-run supply
chain partner of one or more of their customers,
it is unlikely that their role will extend beyond
their core competency of providing traditional
liner services. Furthermore, an independent
may make use of integration strategies to posi
tion themselves as a cost-effective global carrier
as illustrated by Evergreen’s acquisition of Lloyd
Triestino of Italy.
For these reasons, the

independent strategy is excluded from further
analysis although conceptually it would fit well
with a customer’s desire to negotiate individually
with their supply chain partners.

Cooperative Strategies
Cooperative strategies are strategies pursued by
liner operators to bring down their costs and
enhance their capacity utilization. These include
conferences and consortia as well as their recent
incarnations of discussion agreements and
alliances, respectively. Although conference
agreements play a significant role in the northsouth trades in particular, their role in arterial
trade routes that include U.S. ports has been
curtailed drastically and replaced by discussion
agreements (Beargie, 2000). By their nature, a
traditional conference agreement goes against
the principles of contemporary logistics models.
Membership in a liner conference creates a poor
impression among one’s customers today rather
than being the trademark of a quality serviceprovider. It would be perceived by today’s
shipper community as an example of the non
customer orientation of liner operators and
hence, not in congruence with the contemporary
supply chain management practices. As a result,
their demise from the major trade routes
characterized by shippers with sophisticated
logistical needs is understandable. By the same
token, the flexibility of discussion agreements
makes them relatively tolerable for those
shippers although there is a strong likelihood of
their coming under increasing regulatory
scrutiny (Beargie, 2000).
Cooperative strategies help liner operators to
utilize their resources better and reduce their
operating costs. The British and other West
European shipping lines have been the
traditional proponents of asset sharing. U.S.based shipping lines historically stayed away
from such activities for maintaining their
operational freedom. The American companies
resorted to various in-house techniques to control
their costs rather than entering into consortia
and other cooperative working arrangements
(which their competitors elsewhere did). It

became clear to them in the early 1990's that
individual cost-control measures could only go so
far and further savings require greater coopera
tion. This led to a literal explosion of strategic
alliances in liner shipping beginning in the mid1990's (Fossey, 1994; Damas, 1996; and Phillips,
1996). Operators look for the ideal partner(s)
with whom to combine their resources in the
most effective manner whether those are ships,
port terminals or sailing schedules. All major
liner routes are dominated today by one or more
carrier alliances.
The alliances between container operators
generally improve the service frequency and
reduce the transit time in key port-to-port
corridors. This is vital for shippers who demand
more frequent services on the busier sub-trades
as it enables them to reduce their investment in
inventory. The extensive geographical coverage
of an alliance provides all partners with a greater
choice of direct port calls. Through careful
streamlining of joint services, it is possible to
lower port and feeder service-related costs.
Other possibilities include the potential for
sharing of containers, chassis, equipment and
terminals, shared use of feeder vessels, and
streamlining of land-based intermodal services.
Thus, liner operators stand to gain an overall
increase in operating efficiency and some
monetary savings through their alliances that
could be passed on to their customers. However,
there are significant hurdles in the path towards
alliance implementation, especially in the non
shipping sector. The level of difficulty associated
with vessel and terminal sharing is rather low
compared to that associated with other
implementation steps, in particular those related
to inland operations (Kadar, 1996).
Detractors of alliances point towards the
increasing concentration in the sector. Initial
reaction to this strategy was that it was merely
a marketing gimmick, loading half the ship twice
a week rather than loading the whole ship once
a week. After a few years of experience, the
consequences of liner alliances appear more
daunting. Services such as the post-Panamax
pendulum, a combination of all major east-west
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arterial trade routes linking Asia with the U.S.
West Coast and Europe and/or U.S. East Coast
through the Suez Canal, are provided by the
alliances. Such services raise strong entry
barriers for all but the exceptionally strong
independents (like Evergreen Lines of Taiwan).
It has been observed that carrier alliances only
look inward and do not focus on the needs of the
customer or the supply chain, and lack customerorientation (Berzon, 1996). Furthermore, as
these arrangements do not truly rationalize
excess tonnage, those carriers that embraced
alliance-formation as the panacea for all their ills
are likely to be disappointed. By the same token,
the alliances will only work as long as the part
ners maintain their comparable competitiveness
and efficiency. There is no guarantee that this
strategy will be anything more than a short-run
arrangement as is well illustrated by the
frequent shuffling of alliance partners for
immediate operational gains.
As a result,
membership in a global alliance or a consortium
also has limited value from a contemporary
supply chain perspective. It is unlikely that this
strategy would be particularly appealing to a
customer intent on building long-lasting supply
chain alliances.

Integration Strategies
The study will analyze vertical and horizontal
integration strategies of liner operators as they
have a direct relevance to the provision of global
supply chains.

Vertical integration. Historically, it has been
argued that it was the introduction of liner
shipping in the early nineteenth century that
eliminated the need for integrating merchant
and deep-sea shipping (Casson, Barry, and
Horner, 1986). Casson and his team studied 28
shipping companies operating in, or controlled
from the UK. The study found that a significant
number of the shipping companies were involved
in agency services, freight forwarding, steve
doring, warehousing, providing port facilities,
road haulage and distribution. Casson credits
the above developments to the operational
flexibility introduced through containerization,
60

Journal of Transportation Management

and emphasizes that containerization has
strengthened the incentive to integrate shipping
with other modes of transportation and port
facilities (1986).
The unitization of liner cargo by using ISO
marine containers opened up a plethora of
opportunities for liner operators. The use of
large container vessels gave them the necessary
economies of size in their deep-sea shipping
movements without unduly prolonging the time
spent in port. With the elimination of legal
impediments to intermodalism, human ingenuity
began to overcome the traditional boundaries of
liner service that until then did not extend
beyond the immediate vicinity of ports. Thus,
with the arrival of the intermodal era, a new
cycle of innovation began in liner shipping.
Intermodal systems began to emerge and
establish under the leadership of liner
companies. It necessitated the coordination of
ship arrival times with train schedules and their
expeditious inland movement.
But, the
traditional liner feature of encouraging service
competition made it imperative that intermodal
capability be a competitive essential rather than
a mere option. As cargo volumes reached a
critical level, deep-sea liner operators began to
take over the operations of their intermodal
associates with the twin goals of expanding their
area of control and reducing their costs. When
one liner operator establishes itself as a multi
modal entity, competing firms are compelled to
undertake similar operations. In addition to the
acquisition of inland transportation companies,
other vertical integration efforts by liner
shipping companies have included warehouse
and distribution centers, freight forwarders,
customs-house brokers, and EDI firms. The
transition of liner operators into total trans
portation entities has been referred to as one of
the most exciting developments of the intermodal
revolution (McKenzie, North, and Smith, 1989).
However, this strategy began to backfire in the
late 1980’s and early 1990’s. As the intermodal
systems of vertically integrated liner operators
began to mature, their profitability began to
decrease rather than increase. The reasons cited

for this includes the excess capacity in liner
markets and the alleged cross-subsidization of
inland moves by the deep-sea leg. Furthermore,
it appears that some liner operators made some
acquisitions that were not integrated even after
a prolonged period of gestation. They simply
acquired channel members purely to keep up
with their competitors, or out of grand
expectations of creating the best vertically inte
grated transportation structure. This led to
significant restructuring of top liner companies
like American President Companies, Sea-Land,
Nedlloyd and P&OCL that began in the early
1990's and is still continuing as illustrated by the
recent sale of the APL stack-train services. The
top tier liner operators are thus streamlining
their investments and finetuning their networks.
There are fundamental concerns associated with
the vertical integration strategies of liner
operators. Part of this stems from the inherent
incompatibility between the deep-sea mode and
the land-based modes of transportation. Ship
ping has high fixed costs and low variable costs
while the land-based modes of transport have low
fixed and high variable costs (Wood and Johnson,
1995). This results in significant economic in
compatibility when a liner operator attempts to
run its vertically integrated operation. Further
more, shipping companies have a very traditional
hierarchical management structure whereas
running an in-house integrated (liner-oriented)
supply chain requires more of a team-based,
horizontal management structure. Thus, this
liner strategy, although ideally suited for
facilitating global supply chains, is not easy to
implement and requires a virtual catharsis of
traditional liner management philosophy.

Horizontal integration. It was believed
initially for many reasons that containerization
would reinforce the conference system and its
market power (Davies, 1990). Liners began
horizontal integration as a means of amassing
the huge investments required in providing an
efficient, containerized liner service. Financial
interests and even governmental interests have
promoted the operational integration of container
operators under their jurisdiction to attain

economies of scale in the environment that
containerization spawned (UNCTAD, 1970).
Although one could conjure different variations
of the horizontal integration theme, the only
model considered here is a merger or acquisition
involving liner companies. An examination of
such activities in the liner sector shows two
divergent trends that a recent trade journal
categorized as the full integration type and the
multi-brand “federal” type (Lloyd’s Shipping
Economist, 2000). Examples of the first category
include the creation of P&O Nedlloyd Lines, the
NOL-APL merger and the Maersk-Sealand
merger. All these mergers have resulted in the
creation of a single entity that has had a
remarkable impact on the rest of the players,
including the disruption of the alliance
structures in the first two cases. The “federal”
model implies that the parent company oversees
the activities of one or more independently
operated autonomous subsidiaries. Separate
brand names are maintained and run as
individual lines as in the case of CP Ships,
Hamburg Sud and CSAV.
There is little
empirical evidence to support the superiority of
one model over the other. In general, this
strategy is also designed to lower the unit cost of
operation through gains in economies of scale
very similar to that of the cooperative strategies
discussed earlier. However, it provides greater
control in the decision making process albeit at a
heightened level of business risk. While there
are likely to be even more defensive takeovers in
the market, the impact of this strategy from a
global supply chain perspective is unclear.
However, one can conjecture that the emergence
of a merged strong operator (such as the P& O
Nedlloyd Lines, or the new APL brand, or
Maersk-Sealand) with global capability is
attractive to a shipper with sophisticated supply
chain demands. This is especially the case when
these operators also possess significant end-toend distribution capability besides having an
exceptionally well-positioned core competency.
Such capabilities are irrelevant unless the
carrier exhibits the willingness and flexibility to
work with their customers and design tailored
logistics packages.
This would have been
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unlikely but for the introduction of recent
regulatory changes, and are discussed briefly
next.

CHANGES IN LINER
REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT
The global supply chain environment underwent
dramatic changes resulting from recent institu
tional interventions in the liner market. Speci
fically, the U.S. Shipping Act of 1984 was
amended by the Ocean Shipping Reform Act of
1998 (OSRA) and partially deregulated the liner
services in the U.S. foreign commerce. Although
the amendments enacted are numerous, the ones
that have a greater impact from a supply chain
perspective are related to the introduction of
confidential service contracts.
The service contract provision is the most
deregulatory component of the new legislation.
It has expanded the scope and purpose of service
contracts from the original 1984 Act and made it
a truly powerful marketing tool for shipping
companies to differentiate their services from
their competitors. The new service contract
provision allows the co-existence of a
discriminatory contract carriage system with the
common carriage objectives of the tariff system.
Although contracts need to be filed confidentially
with the Federal Maritime Commission (FMC),
except for contracts on exempt commodities, the
previous requirement to file essential terms of a
service contract in tariff format for public review
is seriously curtailed. Strategic components of a
service contract such as inland points for
intermodal movements, freight rates, service
commitments and liquidated damages for non
performance can now remain confidential.
Conferences and consortia will not have the right
to restrict its members from negotiating
individual contracts with shippers although they
may issue voluntary guidelines relating to terms
and procedures for such contracts. The voluntary
guidelines must be submitted to the Federal
Maritime Commission. Another significant de
parture from the 1984 Act is that a contract may
be based on percentage of cargo of the shipper,
not permissible earlier because of its connotation
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to a loyalty contract. Loyalty contracts are still
illegal under OSRA. However, OSRA has altered
the definition of such contracts to one that
includes a deferred rebate. Individual shippers,
shippers’ association as well as a group of
unaffiliated shippers may enter into service
contracts. Similarly, a group of carriers other
than a conference is also allowed to enter into
service contracts.
Although the new service contract provision
allows shippers to sign confidential service
contracts of a global nature, shippers and
carriers have been slow to change their business
practices because of their lack of familiarity with
the new freedoms. An informal FMC survey
found that 83% of 408 contracts filed by the top
13 ocean common carriers in the U.S. foreign
trades lacked confidentiality clauses and only
77% of the remaining 17% required complete
confidentiality (Beargie, 2000). Furthermore, a
majority of the contracts are still negotiated
during four to six weeks in early spring and
many contracts are still confined to a single trade
route with duration of one year or less and there
are very few customized contracts. It is impor
tant to note that operators such as MaerskSealand are reporting a higher than anticipated
number of global contracts (Beargie, 2000). As
these cargoes are typically high value items and
account for a higher percentage based on overall
cargo volume, it is possible that such contracts
will lead to dedicated supply chain alliances in
the future. Maersk Logistics (Gillis, 2000) and
APL Logistics are two outstanding examples of
integrated supply chain initiatives currently
available to international shippers.

CONCLUSIONS AND
MANAGERIAL IMPLICATIONS
The paper discussed developments in contem
porary supply chain models such as the world
class logistics (WCL) model and the 21st Century
Logistics Model. It also scrutinized three major
categories of generic liner operating strategies.
All strategies have their respective pros and cons
when viewed in the context of establishing global
supply chain alliances. Even the much maligned

conference strategy has the advantage of
providing regular and reliable services at
predictable freight rates.
The most basic
incongruity arises when shipper clients are
unable to deal one-on-one with their liner
shipping partners.
Ideally, the vertically
integrated independent liner operators would
provide the best fit and be most congruent in
supply chain alliances as they could possess
logistical capability as well as flexibility. A
vertically integrated liner operator who is
capable of providing consistently reliable and
tailored end-to-end distribution services will be
a true asset in any world class firm’s supply
chain. However, that strategy, attempted by a
handful of liner operators in the late 1980's and
early 1990's, turned out to be structurally incom
patible with liner economics and organizational
structure in the real world. Accordingly, this is
not a feasible option for shippers today. The next
best option for transportation managers is to
seek a liner operator pursuing a horizontal

integration strategy through mergers and/or
acquisitions. The partial deregulation of liner
services in the U.S. provides the right
environment for these initiatives to pursue the
challenge of integrated supply chain
partnerships.
Top tier liner operators are
making good use of this strategy and also
investing in powerful information systems,
another prerequisite for efficient supply chain
management. These global operators focus on
creating vertical alliances with their land-based
counterparts and streamline their joint
operations in providing customized end-to-end
distribution services for their customers. Thus,
they are on the right course to providing a
variety of value-added services despite shedding
some of their initial land-based assets. These
firms are well positioned to benefit from the
sophistication of their logistical capability as
they can provide tailor-made services for their
world class clients in the new millennium and
embark on a strong era of global supply chain
alliances.
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